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Legal and Moral Dimensions of Churchill's Failure to Warn, 
by Anthony D'Amato*, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 561-567 (1998) 
 
Abstract:  Churchill had been given at least forty-eight hours' warning that Coventry would be hit. He could have 
warned the people of Coventry of the impending attack. Yet Churchill determined that any advance warning to the 
people of Coventry would have enabled the Germans to deduce that their top secret code had been broken. The 
coded intercepts provided evidence of the Holocaust in progress. Other ways to reveal information that could have 
bypassed the code system existed, thus providing warning to the public while maintaining a strategic advantage.   
The international law of genocide would have to develop to go beyond intentional acts to acts of misfeasance and 
malfeasance. Such expansion would help to close an uncomfortable gap between international law and international 
morality, for morality and law are symbiotic in the long run.  
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 [pg561]** One of the most striking and widely published photographs of World War II 
depicts a single wall of the great Cathedral of Coventry, still standing after the devastating Ger-
man bombing raid of the night of November 14, 1940. In the foreground with a bishop at his 
right is Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the act of taking a short step with the assistance of 
his cane. Churchill's head is hunched a bit forward in his famous bulldog expression. His 
rounded shoulders seem to hold up all of the burdens of mankind. His countenance is grim. 
 
Throughout the world, people looking at that photograph could read in Churchill's face the 
well-known events of the bombing of Coventry. Air raid sirens had blared out over the industrial 
city located about ninety miles northwest of London, just a few minutes before the drone of the 
Luftwaffe Heinkels was heard. The town was taken by surprise. The first wave of attacks used 
incendiary bombs in order to light fires all over the city, thus illuminating targets for an imme-
diately following wave of high explosive bombs. The bombs hit hospitals and homes, gas and 
water supply mains, and, of course, the famous Coventry Cathedral. A week later the fires were 
still smoldering. 
 
As we now look at the famous photograph of Churchill at Coventry with the benefit of new 
facts, an even more grim visage, one of personal responsibility, is discernable. Churchill had 
been given at least forty-eight hours' warning that Coventry would be hit; he could have warned 
the people of Coventry of the impending attack. The British code breakers working on what is 
now known as the "Ultra Secret"FN1 had given Churchill this advance notice of the German air 
raid. Yet Churchill determined that any advance warning to the people of Coventry would have 
enabled the Germans to deduce that their top secret code had been broken. 
. 
 [pg562]  Churchill does not mention the Ultra Secret or other code breaking in the six vo-
lumes of his memoirs;FN2 only in the 1970s were historians apprised of the extensive Allied 
code breaking during World War II. And only in recent months have some of the main docu-
ments been declassified. We now know that by the summer of 1941 the British knew of the Ho-
locaust through the code intercepts that Professor Halberstam has read to you.FN3 As historian 
Richard Breitman reports, a British Intelligence analyst wrote to Churchill in September 1941 
that there was no point in forwarding any more of these intercepts because it was perfectly ob-





This panel has for the most part focused on two related theses: that the revelation of any in-
formation about these killings would cause the Germans to deduce that the code had been broken 
and the fact that the importance of keeping the code breaking secret is evidenced by Churchill's 
sacrifice of his own people at Coventry. I would like to challenge both propositions. 
 
First, other ways to reveal information that could have bypassed the code system existed, 
thus providing warning to the public while maintaining a strategic advantage. For example, the 
British, knowing when the German planes were coming, could have feigned that their spotters 
along the channel noticed those planes. Then, fictitious reports could have been sent by those 
spotters warning all of the cities in the path of the planes—including Coventry. Given thirty mi-
nutes or an hour's notice, many lives would have been saved. The Germans might never have 
realized the ruse, as they would have assumed that their planes had been spotted. Nothing like 
this was ever attempted. Maybe the War Cabinet was preoccupied with other military matters; 
maybe Churchill felt that the loss of civilian lives was quite acceptable. 
 
Later in the war, the Allies improved their communication without revealing that the code 
had been broken. However, I maintain that their initial silence, of which Coventry was a promi-
nent example, was an error of monumental proportions. The [pg563] British War Cabinet had at 
least forty-eight hours following the Ultra Secret decoding in which to determine how to relay 
warnings effectively and covertly, yet it failed to do so.FN5 The British could have concocted a 
fictional account of a survivor about to be shot, who escaped and returned to provide an eyewit-
ness account of everything. The papers could have dramatized the story to reveal what was hap-
pening. The codes need not have been the sole source of such confidential information. 
 
As the war progressed, the codes were used as a way of focusing information that would then 
be manipulated to appear to have been received some other way in order to protect the viability 
of the code.FN6 That certainly could have been done to prevent the murder of Jews. 
 
Churchill's memoirs are revealing. Despite his personal agenda of self-glorification and his-
torical self-importance, the memoirs nevertheless reveal information that might have been sup-
pressed had Churchill had more time to edit them. He was under a self-imposed time constraint 
to be the first to define the war and his place in it. As Prime Minister and Minister of War (the 
first person in English history to hold both positions), Churchill had access to all of the informa-
tion and resources concerning the entire operation that were necessary to a timely and incisive 
documentation of the war. 
 
I find three aspects of his memoirs to be most revealing. First, Churchill acknowledged that 
at the time he knew that Pearl Harbor was the turning point of the war. Once that happened, he 
predicted that the Allies would win. Interpreting this in light of both a moral perspective and Dr. 
Lamm's comments regarding innocent bystanders,FN7 I would argue that in World War II there 
was a huge difference between the events prior to December 7, 1941, and the events afterwards. 
Prior to that fateful day, we can almost say, as Professor Greenawalt suggests,  FN8 that Chur-
chill was trying to save the lives of his people. The outcome of the war for Great Britain [pg564]  
was in serious doubt. Hitler might have won.  FN9 After that date, however, the question was no 





Whatever the moral calculus was prior to Pearl Harbor, I maintain that it changed decisively 
after December 7, 1941, for it then became important to determine how we were going to con-
duct a war that we knew we would win. Interestingly, Churchill did not make any modifications. 
As reflected in his memoirs, he was in the same battle mode prior to Pearl Harbor as afterwards, 
despite the shift in military posture. Throughout the entire war, Churchill pursued an unchanging, 
totally aggressive strategy—as if lives were at stake when, in fact, they no longer were. This 
failure to modify the post-Pearl Harbor war tactics tremendously clouded Churchill's moral 
judgment. 
 
The German generals, as we know, regarded the Holocaust as a diversion from the war effort. 
They resisted the employment of railroad lines and the use of bullets to kill inmates of the death 
camps. Hitler's "Order Police" was made up of Army rejects.FN10 
 
But to Churchill, who did not have the pessimistic view espoused by the German generals, 
the Holocaust became morally relevant by default. In other words, Churchill knew that the Allies 
(with the assistance of the United States) were definitely going to win the war. Therefore, there 
was room to ask questions other than "Will we win—questions such as "Why are we fighting this 
war' What is its purpose? How can we continue the fight with minimum loss to innocent lives'" 
In short, Churchill had the luxury after Pearl Harbor to question how the war should be pursued 
consistent with the overriding moral aims of the Allies. How the war was fought assumed new 
importance. Therefore, I maintain, unlike my great friend Professor Greenawalt,FN11 that from 
this standpoint a moral culpability for actions and failures to act does attach to the manner in 
which the Allies conducted the war, especially to leaders such as Churchill. 
 
A second theme of the memoirs is that Churchill, while not talking about Karl von Clause-
witz,FN12 nevertheless reveals himself as very Clausewitzian through his overriding theme that 
war is merely an extension of politics by other means.FN13 By viewing war [pg565] as just a 
branch of politics, Churchill was indeed a great statesman and an architect of the postwar era. 
But this "largeness of vision" was, in my view, minor compared to a larger vision of justice and 
morality. 
 
It appears that Churchill, like many politicians, saw policy as an end in itself.FN14 As such, 
in Churchill's hands, the war's political goals became distortedly vague and amorphous, tending 
to be roughly synonymous with "Great Britain prevails." Thus, one explanation for Churchill's 
refusal to publicize the Holocaust was his preoccupation with keeping the Arab nations on the 
side of the Allies, which was stressed throughout the memoirs.FN15 
 
Alternatively, if I had been one of Churchill's secretaries at the time he was writing his me-
moirs, I might have suggested that keeping in the good graces of the various Arabian sultans and 
princes was not very important compared to saving millions of innocent lives. However, Chur-
chill surely would have said that balancing such political and moral issues occurred many times 
daily in the course of a war. Sometimes British troops were led to slaughter simply for demonstr-
ative purposes—that British soldiers would fight to the bitter end and never give up. If I were to 
concede that from a military point of view, this could be an appropriate strategy, but that morally 




Churchill would probably have responded that my comment shows why I am a civilian secretary 
rather than a military commander.FN16 
 
Churchill was always able to trump his generals in the field by relying on the much respected 
Clausewitzian formula that war is conducted in the service of politics. Since Churchill knew 
politics better than any other general, it followed that he was the most knowledgeable as to the 
best military course of action. But I suspect that vagueness and ambiguity in Churchill's own 
mental formulation of these policies served him well, for if the policies had been sharper and 
more distinct, his field and War Cabinet generals [pg566] could have debated them with him. 
However, if the policies were amorphous and constituting "judgment-calls," then Churchill could 
prevail over his generals despite the fact that they knew more about military strategy. 
 
Having established the efficacy of an amorphous policy, it follows that such an amorphous 
policy would not necessarily be derailed by building in a set of moral constraints. What policies 
would have been—and how would they have been—affected by a more proactive stance against 
Hitler's extermination of Jews? This is a question that, of course, does not ever come up in the 
six volumes of Churchill's memoirs.FN17 
 
There is a third area of Churchill's blindness that is revealed by a modern reading of the me-
moirs: Churchill was afraid of Josef Stalin. Throughout the memoirs he railed against Stalin's 
stubbornness and ingratitude; yet a close reading suggests that this very stubbornness and ingrati-
tude kept Churchill on the defensive. No matter how much military materiel the British trans-
ported to the Soviet Union, it was insufficient; Stalin constantly berated Churchill for not send-
ing more. Stalin refused to accept Churchill's rationales that there were fronts in World War II 
other than the Eastern Front. Churchill regarded this as mental density on Stalin's part, but in re-
trospect it is evident that, through these tactics, Stalin gained a strategic advantage over Chur-
chill. Stalin exasperated Churchill, who did not know how to retaliate. As a result, the vast ex-
terminations on the Eastern Front—both of the Russian people and especially of Jews within the 
Russian territories—were issues that Churchill was hesitant to broach with Stalin. 
 
To conclude, imagine an extremely implausible hypothetical case: Churchill is indicted for 
genocide after World War II. There is no evidence of which I am aware that might support Chur-
chill's guilt with regard to complicity in genocide; such a crime requires a specific intent to ex-
ecute a plan of genocide. In this case an honest prosecutor's analysis of the evidence against 
Churchill would not reveal any such specific intent. On this issue I agree completely with Profes-
sor Greenawalt:FN18 It is implausible to think that either Churchill or the British people pos-
sessed any genocidal intent. However, the issue of their negligence is another matter. Under the 
principles of criminal law, negligent manslaughterFN19 is a felony, [pg567] and reckless disre-
gard for human lifeFN20 constitutes manslaughter. 
 
If a postwar tribunal were to acquit Churchill of genocide—as I believe it would have—I 
conclude that he should nevertheless have been charged with culpable negligence. If a race is 
being exterminated, and a world leader could have intervened but chose not to for various 
amorphous political reasons that seemed important at the time, is not that leader guilty of a hein-





Perhaps someday negligence of this order will legally amount to the degree of genocide. The 
international law of genocide would have to develop to go beyond intentional acts to acts of mis-
feasance and malfeasance. Such expansion would help to close an uncomfortable gap between 
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